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Abstract
When perturbation or unexpected events do occur,
agents need protocols for repairing or reforming the
supply chain. Unfortunate contingency could increase
too much the cost of performance, while breaching the
current contract may be more efficient. In our frame-
work the principles of contract law are applied to set
penalties: expectation damages, opportunity cost, re-
liance damages, and party design remedies, and they
are introduced in the task dependency model [14].
1 Introduction
The formation of the supply chain is grounded to
three key technologies: a) the decision-making mecha-
nism of an individual business entity; b) a coordination
mechanism for the allocation of contracts; c) the repre-
sentation of capabilities and services. In this paper we
focus on the second aspect: contract allocation Flexi-
bility and risk sharing in supply contracting is a main
issue when confronted to the uncertain nature of the
environment [12]. Contracts aim at improving flexi-
bility, while preserving the interests of both parties.
Our interest rely on remedies for breach of contracts.
An economic analysis of remedies models their effects
on behavior. The remedies imposed by low affect the
agents’ behavior [3]: (1) searching for trading partners;
(2) negotiating exchanges; (3) drafting the stipulations
in contracts; (4) keeping or breaking promises; (5) tak-
ing precaution against breach causing events; (6) acting
based on reliance on promises; (7) acting to mitigate
damages caused by broken promises; (8) settle disputes
caused by broken promises. In the supply chain context
a contract breach can propagate over the entire chain.
The damages imposed by legal institutions can posi-
tively influence breach propagation. Usually, a contract
breach appears when some perturbation arises on the
market1. Therefore, proper rules imposed by the law
help agents to manage perturbations in supply chain.
Each agent has more than one way to respond to a
perturbation. The question is how can we change the
strategic environment such that the resulting behavior
of the involved agents is efficient? More exactly, what
types of contracts or market structure can impose this
mutually acceptable solution if such a solution exists
and, in the same time, these contracts do not have to
force the agents to act irrationally when a mutual so-
lution does not exist. Our goal is to find which of the
following remedies are adequate for an efficient func-
tionality of the supply chain: expectation damages De,
opportunity cost Do, reliance damages Dr, and party
designed damages Dp.
The main contribution of this paper consists in in-
troducing penalties in task dependency network model.
It also investigates the agents’ decision to breach or
perform the contract when they face different levels of
information sharing.
In the next section we introduce contracts within
the task dependency network model and in section 3
1For instance, the market price of a raw material could rise so
much that, for the agent who had planed to achieve it in order
to produce an item, is more efficient to breach the contract with
its buyer.
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Figure 1. Task dependency network: goods
are indicated by circles, suppliers and con-
sumers are represented by boxes, while pro-
ducers by curved boxes.
we describe the four types of remedies used in the mar-
ket. The section 4 discusses how breach decision is in-
fluenced by information sharing between firms and in
section 5 the functions used by the market for penal-
ties are implemented. Sections 6 and 7 detail future
experiments and related work.
2 Problem specification
2.1 Task Dependency Network
We adapted the task dependency network model [14]
used in the analysis of the supply chain as follows: task
dependency network is a directed, acyclic graph, (V,E),
with vertices V = G∪A, where: G = the set of goods,
A = S∪P∪C the set of agents, S = the set of suppliers,
P = the set of producers, C = the set of consumers,
and a set of edges E connecting agents with their input
and output goods. With each agent a ∈ A we associate
an input set Ia and an output set Oa: Ia = {g ∈ G| ≺
g, a ≻∈ E} and Oa = {g ∈ G| ≺ a, g ≻∈ E}. Agent
a is a supplier if Ia = ∅, a consumer if Oa = ∅, and a
producer in all other cases. Without any generalization
lost, we consider that a consumer c ∈ C needs a single
item (|Ic| = 1) and every supplier s ∈ S or producer
p ∈ P build one single item (|Os| = 1 and |Op| = 1)
An agent must have a contract for all of its input
goods in order to produce its output, named presum-
able2 and denoted by pˆ. If we note np = |Ip|, the agent
has to sign np+1
3 contracts in order to be a member in
the supply chain. For each input good gk ∈ Ip the agent
p bids its own item valuation vkp . The auction for the
good gk sets the transaction price at pk. The agent’s
investments are Ip =
∑np
k=1 pk where k are the winning
2Note that when someone breaches a contract with a presum-
able agent it has to pay more damages.
3Suppliers and consumers have to sign one contract only.
input goods. We note by Igp the agent’s investments
but without considering the investments made for the
current good g. Similarly, we note all bids values sub-
mitted by the agent p as Vp =
∑np
k=1 v
k
p and this value
without considering the bid for good g as V gp . For the
output good, the agent p signs a contract at reliance
price Rp.
We consider that there are no production costs and
when perturbation or unexpected events occur, agents
need protocols for repairing or reforming the supply
chain. ”Allowing decommitment without remedies rises
the question of how to enforce that agents decommit
only when they are in dead ends, and also does not ad-
dress the fact that unilateral decisions for decommit-
ment can potentially break the (possibly desirable) con-
tracts of many other downstream producers” [14]. In-
troducing remedies can reduce aggressive bidding and
mitigate the potential problems.
2.2 Contracts
The goods are transacted using the (M+1)st price
auction protocol [15], which has the property to balance
the offer and the demand at each level in the supply
chain (otherwise the supply demand equilibrium can-
not be achieved globally). It provides a uniform price
mechanism: all contracts determined by a particular
clearing are signed at the same price. In the contract
C =≺ as, ab, gi, Pc, tissue, tmaturity ≻
as represents the seller agent, ab the buyer agent, gi
the good or the transaction subject, Pc the contract
price, tissue is the time when the contract is signed
and tmaturity is the time when the transaction occurs.
During experiments, a contract can be in one of the
following states: active (between tissue and tmaturity
and no breach), violated (at the time of breach tissue ≤
tbreach ≤ tmaturity) or performed (if no party breaches
until tmaturity).
3 Remedies
According to [13], there are five different philoso-
phies of punishment from which all punishment policies
can be derived: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation,
rehabilitation and restoration. Retribution is most ad-
equate for multi-agent systems [9], as it considers that
the contract breach should be repaired by a remedy as
severe as the wrongful act4. The remedies described in
4Courts call a term ”liquidated damages” when it stipulates
damages that do not exceed the actual harm. When the stip-
ulates damages exceed the actual harm caused by breach, the
remedies are called penalties.
this section try to equal the victim’s harm. In the first
three cases5, the system estimates the harm according
to current market conditions, while in the last case, the
agents themselves compute the damages and generate
their own penalties.
3.1 Expectation Damages
The courts reward damages that place the victim
of breach in the position he or she would have been
in if the other party had performed the contract [3].
Therefore, in an ideal situation, the expectation dam-
ages does not affect the potential victims whether the
contract is performed or breached. Ideal expectation
damages remain constant when the promisee relies on
the performance of the contract more than it is opti-
mal.
3.2 Reliance Damages
Reliance increases the loss resulting from the breach
of the contract. Reliance damages put the victim in the
same position after the breach as if he had not signed
a contract with the promisor or anyone else [3]. In an
ideal situation, the reliance damages do not affect the
potential victims whether the contract is breached or
there was no initial contract. No contract provides a
baseline for computing the injury. Using this baseline,
the courts may reward damages that place victims of
breach in the position that they would have been, if
they had never contracted with another agent. Re-
liance damages represent the difference between profit
if there is no contract and the current profit.
3.3 Opportunity Cost
Signing a contract often entails the loss of an op-
portunity to make an alternative. The lost oppor-
tunity provides a baseline for computing the dam-
age. Using this baseline, the courts reward damages
that place victims of breach in the position that they
would have been if they had signed the contract that
would have been the best alternative to the one that
was breached [3]. In the ideal situation, the opportu-
nity cost damages does not affect the potential victims
whether the contract is breached or the best alternative
contract is performed6. If breach causes the injured
party to purchase a substitute item, the opportunity
5Expectation damages, reliance damages and opportunity
cost are analyzed from an economical point of view in [3, 6].
6Opportunity cost and expectation damages approach equal-
ity as markets approach perfect competition.
cost formula equals the difference between the best al-
ternative contract price available at the time of con-
tracting and the price of the substitute item obtained
after the breach.
3.4 Party-Designed Remedies
The contract might stipulate a sum of money
that the breaker will pay to the party without guilt.
These ”leveled commitment contracts” [10] allow self-
interested agents to face the events that unfolded since
the contract started. A rational person damages oth-
ers whenever the benefit is large enough to pay an ideal
compensation and have some profit, as required to in-
crease efficiency. Game theoretic analysis has shown
that leveled committed contracts increase the Pareto
efficiency of contracts. One contract may charge a high
price and offer to pay high damages if the seller fails to
deliver the goods, while another contract may charge
a low price and offer to pay low damages, the types
of contracts separating the set of buyers and allowing
”price discrimination.”
4 Efficient breach
Breaching is more efficient than performing when
the costs of performing exceed the benefits to all par-
ties. The costs of performing exceed the benefits when
a contingency materializes so that it makes the needed
resources for performance more valuable in an alter-
native usage. Two types of contingencies reorder the
value of resources: unfortunate contingency increases
the cost of performance (an unpredictable strike) or for-
tunate contingency makes nonperformance even more
profitable than performance (the seller discovers a
buyer who values the product even more).
The literature distinguishes between a priori and
a posteriori decided sanctions. According to [9], we
consider that a posteriori decided penalties should be
avoided in agent-based modeling, since they do not al-
low agents to reason about when to respect their com-
mitments. Therefore, all the above remedies De, Dr,
Do, and Dp are common knowledge and settled a pri-
ori. Nevertheless, only Dp penalty fully reveals the
amount of money the agents will pay in case of breach.
In the other cases, more information is needed for an
agent in order to anticipate how high remedies he or she
has to pay. Hence, the potential victim could advertise
how much he or she will lose depending on the types
of remedies imposed by the market (see table 1). This
approach stresses the relation between legal rules, com-
munication and common knowledge. We define three
levels of information sharing as in [17] (no share, share
Remedy Information shared
De expected profit
Do provided by the market
Dr investments made
Dp known from contract
Table 1. Dependence of shared information
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Figure 2. Supplier-Consumer contract
to each neighbor, and broadcast sharing) and we will
analyze the social welfare in each case. The market
should provide incentives for information sharing. In
our case, hiding such information in order to collect
more penalties should not be encourage by the reme-
dies rules.
5 Case Analysis
The conclusions from the last sections are: (i) The
amount of expectation damages must place the victim
in the same position as if the actual contract had been
performed 7(ii) The amount of reliance damages must
place the victim in the same position as if no contract
had been signed; (iii) The amount of opportunity-cost
damages must place the victim in the same position as
if the best alternative contract had been performed;
(iv) Party designed remedies specify themselves the
amount of damages in case of a breach.
5.1 No substitute
5.1.1 Supplier-Consumer:
First, we analyze the easiest case in which a contract
is signed between a supplier and a client. Recall that a
supplier is an agent who does not have any input good
in task dependency network model, while the consumer
is an agent who does not have any output good.
7We assume that the rate of breach is low. Otherwise, it can
be anticipated to some extent, and so the promisee can plan for
breach, just as airlines and hotels plan for ”no-shows [3].”
The consumer breaches the contract: In fig. 2a)
the suppliers s5 and s6 want to sell good g5 at price
11 and respectively 13, while the agents p5, and c3 try
to buy it at prices 12 and 15. According to (M+1)st
price protocol the transaction price is Pc = 12$. The
auction clears at every round. In fig. 2b) a single con-
tract is signed: C1g5 =≺ s5, c3, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻
Consider that c3 breaches the contract. In this case,
the remedies will be:
Expectation damages : if the agent c3 performs, the s5’s
estimated profit is the difference between the contract
price Pc = 12 and its own valuation
8 vg5a6 = 11 (victim
valuation). The remedies compensate this value:
De = Pc − v
g
a
Opportunity damages : first, the auctioneer has to com-
pute the opportunity cost Po, which is the transaction
cost in case the breacher was absent from the auc-
tion. In fig. 2, if agent c3 is not present Po = 11.
The s5’s bid is one who wins. The contract would be
C1g5 =≺ s5, p5, g5, 11, tissue, tmaturity ≻ and the agent’s
profit would be Po−vga. But, when there is no contract
for agent s5, his profit would be null. The opportu-
nity damages should reflect this. We define opportu-
nity cost damage Do which is received by the agent a
as:
Do = max(Po − v
g
a, 0)
Reliance damages : if the victim does not have any in-
put good, the supplier’s investments in performing are
null: Dr = 0.
Party-designed remedies : the remedies may be a frac-
tion from the contract price (Dp = α ·Pc) or a fraction
from the expected profit (Dp = α · De) or constant
(Dp = C). In each of the following cases, this type of
remedies is computed in the same manner.
The supplier breaches the contract: Consider
that s5 breaches contract C
1
g5
.
Expectation damages : De = v
g
a − Pc.
Opportunity damages : if the breacher had not bid and
the victim had signed a contract at the opportunity
price Po, than it’s profit would have been v
g
a − Po. If
the victim has no contract when the breacher is not
bidding, it receives no damages. Hence
Do = max(v
g
a − Po, 0)
In the depicted case, if the agent s5 had not existed, c3
would have signed a contract with s6 for an opportunity
cost Po = 12. Therefore, Do = 3.
Reliance damages : because the client does not produce
any output goods, it’s reliance is null: Dr = 0.
8(M+1)st price auction has the following property: the dom-
inant strategy for each agent is to reveal its real valuation.
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Figure 3. Supplier-Producer contract
5.1.2 Supplier-Producer
The supplier breaches the contract: Consider
C =≺ s5, p5, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻ from fig. 3.
Expectation damages: Observe that the victim is a pre-
sumable agent because it has contracts for all its input
goods. Its investments are Ip = 5 + 9 + 12 = 26 and
Ig5p = 9 + 5 = 14. The producer p5 has also a con-
tract for its output item, so Rp5 = 34. Its profit is
Rp5 − Ip = 8. When bad contracts have been signed
this value can be negative, therefore no damages are
imposed. Otherwise, expectation damages equals the
difference between its bid and the contract price:
De =
{
max(Rp − Ip, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp
vgp − Pc, otherwise
Recall pˆ means that agent p is presumable.
Opportunity cost : one seller less implies Po ≥ Pc.
Do =


max(Rp − Igp − Po, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
vgp − Po, ¬pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
0, ¬∃Po
which is equivalent to:
Do =
{
max(Rp − I
g
p − Po, 0), pˆ,∃Rp, ∃Po
max(vgp − Po, 0), otherwise
Reliance damages :
Dr =
{
V gp − I
g
p +Rp − v
go
p , pˆ, ∃Rp
V gp − I
gk
p , otherwise
Here go is the output good of the agent p and I
gk
p rep-
resents all k contracts signed for input goods, where
k < np. In the depicted case p5 is presumable and
there is a contract with a buyer. Therefore, it has to
receive, as a victim, the next reliance damages Dr =
V g5p5 − I
g5
p5
+Rp5−v
g6
p5
= (10+5)− (9+5)+34−32 = 3.
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Figure 4. Producer-Consumer contract
In some cases damages can be higher than the con-
tract value itself (Dr ≥ Pc). According to current
practice in law, these damages are the right ones if
the victim gives a previous notification about the risks
faced by the potential breacher. This a clear situa-
tion when information propagation improves the sup-
ply chain performance. In the light of the above facts,
their reliance damages should remain the mentioned
ones if the victim has notified its partner, but should
be maxim Pc otherwise. Hence, we define D
′
r:
D′r =
{
Dr, the breacher receives a notice
min(Dr, Pc), otherwise
5.1.3 Producer-Consumer
The consumer breaches the contract: Consider
the contract C =≺ p5, c2, g6, 34, tissue, tmaturity ≻ from
fig. 4, where c2 breaches.
Expectation damages :
De =
{
max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ
Pc − vgp , otherwise
In this case, p5 is presumable and De = 34 − (12 +
9 + 5) = 8. Suppose the agent p5 does not have any
contract for one input good. Therefore, it is not pre-
sumable and it will receive De = 34− 32.
Opportunity cost : one buyer less implies Po ≤ Pc
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po
Po − vgp, ¬pˆ, ∃Po
0, ∃Po)
which is equivalent to:
Do =
{
max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po
max(Po − vgp , 0), otherwise
Reliance damages : Dr = Vp − Ip.
5.2 Substitute
The common law requires the promisee to mitigate
damages. Specifically, the promisee must take reason-
able actions to reduce losses occurred by the promisor’s
breach. The market can force the victim to find sub-
stitute items, in this case the imposed damages reflect
only the difference between original contract and sub-
stitute contract. With a substitute contract, the victim
signs for the identical item, with the same deadline or
tmaturity, but at a different price. Let Ps be the value of
the substitute contract9. For the general case Producer-
Producer, when the buyer breaches the contract,
the equations become:
Expectation damages :
De =


max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ, ¬∃Ps
Pc − vgp , pˆ, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps), ∃Ps
Opportunity cost :
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − vgp , 0), ¬pˆ,∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
Reliance damages :
Do =
{
Vp − Ip, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
6 Planned experiments
First, the framework can be used as a tool for au-
tomated online dispute resolution (ODR). There are
three situations: (i) The market may have substantial
authority, hence one remedy is imposed to all agents.
In this case, the amount of penalties can be automat-
ically computed with this framework. (ii) Consistent
with party autonomy, the agents may settle on differ-
ent remedies at contracting time. This approach in-
creases the flexibility and efficiency, because the agents
are the ones who know what type of remedy protects
better their interests. (iii) All the above remedies in-
fluence the amount of penalties : in this approach the
role of the framework is to monitor the market and
collect data such as: the expected profit, the opportu-
nity cost, the amount of investments made, if there is
a substitute at tbreach. All these information are used
as arguments when the dispute is arbitrated [11] in an
9
Ps comes from ”spot market” while the original contract
value refers to ”future market”.
Expected Profit
Opportunity Cost
Reliance
Substitute
Time of breach
Law Law Training Set Algorithm
Remedy
Inference
Mechanism
Data Relevance Inference Relevance
Figure 5. Toulmin argument structure
architecture which combine rule base reasoning (laws)
and case base reasoning (training set) as fig 5.
Second, knowing the bids, the actual contracts, the
amount of potential remedies, and the available offers
on the market, the framework can identify situations
in which for both agents is more profitable to breach
the contract when a fortunate or an unfortunate con-
tingency appears. It computes pairs of suggestions,
helping to increase total welfare towards Pareto fron-
tier.
Third, as a simulation tool, the market designer
may obtain results regarding the following questions:
what types of remedies assured flexibility in the supply
chain? or how information sharing influences total rev-
enues or can be use to compute optimum reliance? In
the prototype developed we are currently making ex-
periments with different types of agents: low-high re-
liance, breach often-seldom, sharing information-don’t
share, risk seeking-averse (when they are risk averse,
the penalties do not need to be so high to make breach-
ers behave appropriately).
7 Related Work
The task dependency network model was pro-
posed [14] as an efficient market mechanism in achiev-
ing supply chain coordination. However, this approach
is rather a timeless-riskless economy. On real markets
a firm seldom signs contracts with its buyers and its
suppliers simultaneously. Moreover, the breach of a
contract implies no penalties, which is an unrealistic
assumption in real world. In contrast, in our model
we used auctions, which end independently, and we in-
troduce penalties in case of contract breaching. We
have made less strictly the assumption that the pro-
ducer places its first output offer only after receiving
the first price quotes for all its inputs. One objective is
to compute how high these penalties should be in order
to maintain efficiency of the supply chain.
Whether selfish companies have individual incentive
to use information sharing for reducing the bull-whip
effect [8] has been studied considering three levels of in-
formation sharing: not share, share to each neighbor,
and broadcast sharing. Instead, we have used the same
levels of information sharing in order to help agents de-
cide when to breach. The agents in our framework sign
simple formal contracts, but more complex contracts
need semantic interpretation for automated ODR [7].
The role of sanctions in multi-agent systems [9] is the
enforcement of a social control mechanism for the sat-
isfaction of commitments. We focus only on material
sanctions and we do not include social sanctions which
affect trust, credibility or reputation. Moreover, we
have applied four types of material remedies in a spe-
cific domain. In the same spirit of computing penalties
according to the level of harm produced, the amount
of remedies may depend on the time when the contract
was breached [5]. Expectation damages, reliance dam-
ages, and opportunity have also been studied [4, 3, 6]
and how contracts influence the supply chain coordina-
tion or strategic breach appear in [2, 10].
The Toulmin argument structure was used in a
framework for computing the distribution of matrimo-
nial property [1]. The domain was modelled by extract-
ing the relevant variables with the help of experts and
a neuronal network was used as inference mechanism.
We apply principles of contract law to determine the
amount of remedies and, in our business scenario, data
used for argumentation can be automatically extracted
from the task dependency network.
8 Conclusions
The design of punishment policies applied to specific
domains linking agents actions to material penalties is
an open research issue [9]. The contribution of this
paper contains two ideas: On the one hand, we apply
the principles of contract law in the task dependency
network model [14]. As a result, we enrich that model
by including different types of penalties when agents
breach, thus bringing the model closer to the real world.
On the other hand, in our work we consider penal-
ties that ensure a higher welfare for the supply chains
affected by perturbations, with three levels of informa-
tion sharing for each type of remedy. This framework is
useful for automated ODR. The data obtained can be
used as arguments in a mediated dispute or the reme-
dies can be computed in real time in case the agents
agreed with the market policy.
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Abstract
When perturbation or unexpected events do occur,
agents need protocols for repairing or reforming the
supply chain. Unfortunate contingency could increase
too much the cost of performance, while breaching the
current contract may be more efficient. In our frame-
work the principles of contract law are applied to set
penalties: expectation damages, opportunity cost, re-
liance damages, and party design remedies, and they
are introduced in the task dependency model [?].
1 Introduction
The formation of the supply chain is grounded to
three key technologies: a) the decision-making mech-
anism of an individual business entity; b) a coordina-
tion mechanism for the allocation of contracts; c) the
representation of capabilities and services. In this pa-
per we focus on the second aspect: contract allocation
Flexibility and risk sharing in supply contracting is a
main issue when confronted to the uncertain nature of
the environment [?]. Contracts aim at improving flex-
ibility, while preserving the interests of both parties.
Our interest rely on remedies for breach of contracts.
An economic analysis of remedies models their effects
on behavior. The remedies imposed by low affect the
agents’ behavior [?]: (1) searching for trading partners;
(2) negotiating exchanges; (3) drafting the stipulations
in contracts; (4) keeping or breaking promises; (5) tak-
ing precaution against breach causing events; (6) acting
based on reliance on promises; (7) acting to mitigate
damages caused by broken promises; (8) settle disputes
caused by broken promises. In the supply chain context
a contract breach can propagate over the entire chain.
The damages imposed by legal institutions can posi-
tively influence breach propagation. Usually, a contract
breach appears when some perturbation arises on the
market1. Therefore, proper rules imposed by the law
help agents to manage perturbations in supply chain.
Each agent has more than one way to respond to a
perturbation. The question is how can we change the
strategic environment such that the resulting behavior
of the involved agents is efficient? More exactly, what
types of contracts or market structure can impose this
mutually acceptable solution if such a solution exists
and, in the same time, these contracts do not have to
force the agents to act irrationally when a mutual so-
lution does not exist. Our goal is to find which of the
following remedies are adequate for an efficient func-
tionality of the supply chain: expectation damages De,
opportunity cost Do, reliance damages Dr, and party
designed damages Dp.
The main contribution of this paper consists in in-
troducing penalties in task dependency network model.
It also investigates the agents’ decision to breach or
perform the contract when they face different levels of
information sharing.
In the next section we introduce contracts within
the task dependency network model and in section 3
1For instance, the market price of a raw material could rise so
much that, for the agent who had planed to achieve it in order
to produce an item, is more efficient to breach the contract with
its buyer.
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Figure 1. Task dependency network: goods
are indicated by circles, suppliers and con-
sumers are represented by boxes, while pro-
ducers by curved boxes.
we describe the four types of remedies used in the mar-
ket. The section 4 discusses how breach decision is in-
fluenced by information sharing between firms and in
section 5 the functions used by the market for penal-
ties are implemented. Sections 6 and 7 detail future
experiments and related work.
2 Problem specification
2.1 Task Dependency Network
We adapted the task dependency network model [?]
used in the analysis of the supply chain as follows: task
dependency network is a directed, acyclic graph, (V,E),
with vertices V = G∪A, where: G = the set of goods,
A = S∪P∪C the set of agents, S = the set of suppliers,
P = the set of producers, C = the set of consumers,
and a set of edges E connecting agents with their input
and output goods. With each agent a ∈ A we associate
an input set Ia and an output set Oa: Ia = {g ∈ G| ≺
g, a ≻∈ E} and Oa = {g ∈ G| ≺ a, g ≻∈ E}. Agent
a is a supplier if Ia = ∅, a consumer if Oa = ∅, and a
producer in all other cases. Without any generalization
lost, we consider that a consumer c ∈ C needs a single
item (|Ic| = 1) and every supplier s ∈ S or producer
p ∈ P build one single item (|Os| = 1 and |Op| = 1)
An agent must have a contract for all of its input
goods in order to produce its output, named presum-
able2 and denoted by pˆ. If we note np = |Ip|, the agent
has to sign np+1
3 contracts in order to be a member in
the supply chain. For each input good gk ∈ Ip the agent
p bids its own item valuation vkp . The auction for the
good gk sets the transaction price at pk. The agent’s
investments are Ip =
∑np
k=1 pk where k are the winning
2Note that when someone breaches a contract with a presum-
able agent it has to pay more damages.
3Suppliers and consumers have to sign one contract only.
input goods. We note by Igp the agent’s investments
but without considering the investments made for the
current good g. Similarly, we note all bids values sub-
mitted by the agent p as Vp =
∑np
k=1 v
k
p and this value
without considering the bid for good g as V gp . For the
output good, the agent p signs a contract at reliance
price Rp.
We consider that there are no production costs and
when perturbation or unexpected events occur, agents
need protocols for repairing or reforming the supply
chain. ”Allowing decommitment without remedies rises
the question of how to enforce that agents decommit
only when they are in dead ends, and also does not
address the fact that unilateral decisions for decom-
mitment can potentially break the (possibly desirable)
contracts of many other downstream producers”[?]. In-
troducing remedies can reduce aggressive bidding and
mitigate the potential problems.
2.2 Contracts
The goods are transacted using the (M+1)st price
auction protocol [?], which has the property to balance
the offer and the demand at each level in the supply
chain (otherwise the supply demand equilibrium can-
not be achieved globally). It provides a uniform price
mechanism: all contracts determined by a particular
clearing are signed at the same price. In the contract
C =≺ as, ab, gi, Pc, tissue, tmaturity ≻
as represents the seller agent, ab the buyer agent, gi
the good or the transaction subject, Pc the contract
price, tissue is the time when the contract is signed
and tmaturity is the time when the transaction occurs.
During experiments, a contract can be in one of the
following states: active (between tissue and tmaturity
and no breach), violated (at the time of breach tissue ≤
tbreach ≤ tmaturity) or performed (if no party breaches
until tmaturity).
3 Remedies
According to [?], there are five different philosophies
of punishment from which all punishment policies can
be derived: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, re-
habilitation and restoration. Retribution is most ade-
quate for multi-agent systems [?], as it considers that
the contract breach should be repaired by a remedy as
severe as the wrongful act4. The remedies described in
4Courts call a term ”liquidated damages” when it stipulates
damages that do not exceed the actual harm. When the stip-
ulates damages exceed the actual harm caused by breach, the
remedies are called penalties.
this section try to equal the victim’s harm. In the first
three cases5, the system estimates the harm according
to current market conditions, while in the last case, the
agents themselves compute the damages and generate
their own penalties.
3.1 Expectation Damages
The courts reward damages that place the victim
of breach in the position he or she would have been
in if the other party had performed the contract [?].
Therefore, in an ideal situation, the expectation dam-
ages does not affect the potential victims whether the
contract is performed or breached. Ideal expectation
damages remain constant when the promisee relies on
the performance of the contract more than it is opti-
mal.
3.2 Reliance Damages
Reliance increases the loss resulting from the breach
of the contract. Reliance damages put the victim in the
same position after the breach as if he had not signed
a contract with the promisor or anyone else [?]. In an
ideal situation, the reliance damages do not affect the
potential victims whether the contract is breached or
there was no initial contract. No contract provides a
baseline for computing the injury. Using this baseline,
the courts may reward damages that place victims of
breach in the position that they would have been, if
they had never contracted with another agent. Re-
liance damages represent the difference between profit
if there is no contract and the current profit.
3.3 Opportunity Cost
Signing a contract often entails the loss of an op-
portunity to make an alternative. The lost oppor-
tunity provides a baseline for computing the dam-
age. Using this baseline, the courts reward damages
that place victims of breach in the position that they
would have been if they had signed the contract that
would have been the best alternative to the one that
was breached [?]. In the ideal situation, the opportu-
nity cost damages does not affect the potential victims
whether the contract is breached or the best alternative
contract is performed6. If breach causes the injured
party to purchase a substitute item, the opportunity
5Expectation damages, reliance damages and opportunity
cost are analyzed from an economical point of view in [?, ?].
6Opportunity cost and expectation damages approach equal-
ity as markets approach perfect competition.
cost formula equals the difference between the best al-
ternative contract price available at the time of con-
tracting and the price of the substitute item obtained
after the breach.
3.4 Party-Designed Remedies
The contract might stipulate a sum of money that
the breaker will pay to the party without guilt. These
”leveled commitment contracts”[?] allow self-interested
agents to face the events that unfolded since the con-
tract started. A rational person damages others when-
ever the benefit is large enough to pay an ideal com-
pensation and have some profit, as required to increase
efficiency. Game theoretic analysis has shown that lev-
eled committed contracts increase the Pareto efficiency
of contracts. One contract may charge a high price and
offer to pay high damages if the seller fails to deliver
the goods, while another contract may charge a low
price and offer to pay low damages, the types of con-
tracts separating the set of buyers and allowing ”price
discrimination.”
4 Efficient breach
Breaching is more efficient than performing when
the costs of performing exceed the benefits to all par-
ties. The costs of performing exceed the benefits when
a contingency materializes so that it makes the needed
resources for performance more valuable in an alter-
native usage. Two types of contingencies reorder the
value of resources: unfortunate contingency increases
the cost of performance (an unpredictable strike) or for-
tunate contingency makes nonperformance even more
profitable than performance (the seller discovers a
buyer who values the product even more).
The literature distinguishes between a priori and
a posteriori decided sanctions. According to [?], we
consider that a posteriori decided penalties should be
avoided in agent-based modeling, since they do not al-
low agents to reason about when to respect their com-
mitments. Therefore, all the above remedies De, Dr,
Do, and Dp are common knowledge and settled a pri-
ori. Nevertheless, only Dp penalty fully reveals the
amount of money the agents will pay in case of breach.
In the other cases, more information is needed for an
agent in order to anticipate how high remedies he or she
has to pay. Hence, the potential victim could advertise
how much he or she will lose depending on the types
of remedies imposed by the market (see table 1). This
approach stresses the relation between legal rules, com-
munication and common knowledge. We define three
levels of information sharing as in [17] (no share, share
Remedy Information shared
De expected profit
Do provided by the market
Dr investments made
Dp known from contract
Table 1. Dependence of shared information
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Figure 2. Supplier-Consumer contract
to each neighbor, and broadcast sharing) and we will
analyze the social welfare in each case. The market
should provide incentives for information sharing. In
our case, hiding such information in order to collect
more penalties should not be encourage by the reme-
dies rules.
5 Case Analysis
The conclusions from the last sections are: (i) The
amount of expectation damages must place the victim
in the same position as if the actual contract had been
performed 7(ii) The amount of reliance damages must
place the victim in the same position as if no contract
had been signed; (iii) The amount of opportunity-cost
damages must place the victim in the same position as
if the best alternative contract had been performed;
(iv) Party designed remedies specify themselves the
amount of damages in case of a breach.
5.1 No substitute
5.1.1 Supplier-Consumer:
First, we analyze the easiest case in which a contract
is signed between a supplier and a client. Recall that a
supplier is an agent who does not have any input good
in task dependency network model, while the consumer
is an agent who does not have any output good.
7We assume that the rate of breach is low. Otherwise, it can
be anticipated to some extent, and so the promisee can plan for
breach, just as airlines and hotels plan for ”no-shows [?].”
The consumer breaches the contract: In fig. 2a)
the suppliers s5 and s6 want to sell good g5 at price
11 and respectively 13, while the agents p5, and c3 try
to buy it at prices 12 and 15. According to (M+1)st
price protocol the transaction price is Pc = 12$. The
auction clears at every round. In fig. 2b) a single con-
tract is signed: C1g5 =≺ s5, c3, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻
Consider that c3 breaches the contract. In this case,
the remedies will be:
Expectation damages : if the agent c3 performs, the s5’s
estimated profit is the difference between the contract
price Pc = 12 and its own valuation
8 vg5a6 = 11 (victim
valuation). The remedies compensate this value:
De = Pc − v
g
a
Opportunity damages : first, the auctioneer has to com-
pute the opportunity cost Po, which is the transaction
cost in case the breacher was absent from the auc-
tion. In fig. 2, if agent c3 is not present Po = 11.
The s5’s bid is one who wins. The contract would be
C1g5 =≺ s5, p5, g5, 11, tissue, tmaturity ≻ and the agent’s
profit would be Po−vga. But, when there is no contract
for agent s5, his profit would be null. The opportunity
damages should reflect this. Hence, we define opportu-
nity cost damage Do which is received by the agent a
as:
Do = max(Po − v
g
a, 0)
Reliance damages : if the victim does not have any in-
put good, the supplier’s investments in performing are
null: Dr = 0.
Party-designed remedies : the remedies may be a frac-
tion from the contract price (Dp = α ·Pc) or a fraction
from the expected profit (Dp = α · De) or constant
(Dp = C). In each of the following cases, this type of
remedies is computed in the same manner.
The supplier breaches the contract: Consider
that s5 breaches contract C
1
g5
.
Expectation damages : De = v
g
a − Pc.
Opportunity damages : if the breacher had not bid and
the victim had signed a contract at the opportunity
price Po, than it’s profit would have been v
g
a − Po. If
the victim has no contract when the breacher is not
bidding, it receives no damages. Hence
Do = max(v
g
a − Po, 0)
In the depicted case, if the agent s5 had not existed, c3
would have signed a contract with s6 for an opportunity
cost Po = 12. Therefore, Do = 3.
Reliance damages : because the client does not produce
any output goods, it’s reliance is null: Dr = 0.
8(M+1)st price auction has the following property: the dom-
inant strategy for each agent is to reveal its real valuation.
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Figure 3. Supplier-Producer contract
5.1.2 Supplier-Producer
The supplier breaches the contract: Consider
C =≺ s5, p5, g5, 12, tissue, tmaturity ≻ from fig. 3.
Expectation damages: Observe that the victim is a pre-
sumable agent because it has contracts for all its input
goods. Its investments are Ip = 5 + 9 + 12 = 26 and
Ig5p = 9 + 5 = 14. The producer p5 has also a con-
tract for its output item, so Rp5 = 34. Its profit is
Rp5 − Ip = 8. When bad contracts have been signed
this value can be negative, therefore no damages are
imposed. Otherwise, expectation damages equals the
difference between its bid and the contract price:
De =
{
max(Rp − Ip, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp
vgp − Pc, otherwise
Recall pˆ means that agent p is presumable.
Opportunity cost : one seller less implies Po ≥ Pc.
Do =


max(Rp − Igp − Po, 0), pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
vgp − Po, ¬pˆ, ∃Rp, ∃Po
0, ¬∃Po
which is equivalent to:
Do =
{
max(Rp − I
g
p − Po, 0), pˆ,∃Rp, ∃Po
max(vgp − Po, 0), otherwise
Reliance damages :
Dr =
{
V gp − I
g
p +Rp − v
go
p , pˆ, ∃Rp
V gp − I
gk
p , otherwise
Here go is the output good of the agent p and I
gk
p rep-
resents all k contracts signed for input goods, where
k < np. In the depicted case p5 is presumable and
there is a contract with a buyer. Therefore, it has to
receive, as a victim, the next reliance damages Dr =
V g5p5 − I
g5
p5
+Rp5−v
g6
p5
= (10+5)− (9+5)+34−32 = 3.
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Figure 4. Producer-Consumer contract
In some cases damages can be higher than the con-
tract value itself (Dr ≥ Pc). According to current
practice in law, these damages are the right ones if
the victim gives a previous notification about the risks
faced by the potential breacher. This a clear situa-
tion when information propagation improves the sup-
ply chain performance. In the light of the above facts,
their reliance damages should remain the mentioned
ones if the victim has notified its partner, but should
be maxim Pc otherwise. Hence, we define D
′
r:
D′r =
{
Dr, the breacher receives a notice
min(Dr, Pc), otherwise
5.1.3 Producer-Consumer
The consumer breaches the contract: Consider
the contract C =≺ p5, c2, g6, 34, tissue, tmaturity ≻ from
fig. 4, where c2 breaches.
Expectation damages :
De =
{
max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ
Pc − vgp , otherwise
In this case, p5 is presumable and De = 34 − (12 +
9 + 5) = 8. Suppose the agent p5 does not have any
contract for one input good. Therefore, it is not pre-
sumable and it will receive De = 34− 32.
Opportunity cost : one buyer less implies Po ≤ Pc
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po
Po − vgp, ¬pˆ, ∃Po
0, ∃Po)
which is equivalent to:
Do =
{
max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po
max(Po − vgp , 0), otherwise
Reliance damages : Dr = Vp − Ip.
5.2 Substitute
The common law requires the promisee to mitigate
damages. Specifically, the promisee must take reason-
able actions to reduce losses occurred by the promisor’s
breach. The market can force the victim to find sub-
stitute items, in this case the imposed damages reflect
only the difference between original contract and sub-
stitute contract. With a substitute contract, the victim
signs for the identical item, with the same deadline or
tmaturity, but at a different price. Let Ps be the value of
the substitute contract9. For the general case Producer-
Producer, when the buyer breaches the contract,
the equations become:
Expectation damages :
De =


max(Pc − Igp , 0), pˆ, ¬∃Ps
Pc − vgp , pˆ, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps), ∃Ps
Opportunity cost :
Do =


max(Po − Igp , 0), pˆ, ∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − vgp , 0), ¬pˆ,∃Po, ¬∃Ps
max(Po − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
Reliance damages :
Do =
{
Vp − Ip, ¬∃Ps
max(Pc − Ps, 0), ∃Ps
6 Planned experiments
First, the framework can be used as a tool for au-
tomated online dispute resolution (ODR). There are
three situations: (i)The market may have substantial
authority, hence one remedy is imposed to all agents.
In this case, the amount of penalties can be automati-
cally computed with this framework. (ii) (ii) Consistent
with party autonomy, the agents may settle on different
remedies at contracting time. This approach increases
the flexibility and efficiency, because the agents are the
ones who know what type of remedy protects better
their interests. (iii) All the above remedies influence
the amount of damage: in this approach the role of the
framework is to monitor the market and collect data
such as: the expected profit, the opportunity cost, the
amount of investments made, if there is a substitute at
tbreach. All these information are used as arguments
when the dispute is arbitrated [?] as in fig ??
9
Ps comes from ”spot market” while the original contract
value refers to ”future market”.
Figure 5. Performance in our framework
Second, knowing the bids, the actual contracts, the
amount of potential remedies, and the available offers
on the market, the framework can identify situations
in which for both agents is more profitable to breach
the contract. It computes pairs of suggestions, helping
to increase total welfare towards Pareto frontier.
Third, as a simulation tool, on the one hand, the
market designer may obtain results regarding the fol-
lowing questions: what types of remedies assured flexi-
bility in the supply chain? or how information sharing
influences total revenues or can be use to compute op-
timum reliance?. In the prototype developed we are
currently making experiments with different types of
agents: low/high reliance, breach often/seldom, shar-
ing information/don’t share, risk seeking/averse (when
they are risk averse, the penalties do not need to be so
high to make breachers behave appropriately).
7 Related Work
The task dependency network model was pro-
posed [?] as an efficient market mechanism in achieving
supply chain coordination. However, this approach is
rather a timeless-riskless economy. On real markets
a firm seldom signs contracts with its buyers and its
suppliers simultaneously. Moreover, the breach of a
contract implies no penalties, which is an unrealistic
assumption in real world. In contrast, in our model
we used auctions, which end independently, and we in-
troduce penalties in case of contract breaching. We
have made less strictly the assumption that the pro-
ducer places its first output offer only after receiving
the first price quotes for all its inputs. One objective is
to compute how high these penalties should be in order
to maintain efficiency of the supply chain.
Whether selfish companies have individual incentive
to use information sharing for reducing the bull-whip
effect [?, ?, ?] has been studied considering three lev-
els of information sharing: not share, share to each
neighbor, and broadcast sharing. Instead, we have used
the same levels of information sharing in order to help
agents decide when to breach. An interesting and ac-
tual issue consists also in representing contracts in the
semantic web [?], but more complex contracts need se-
mantic interpretation for automated ODR.
The role of sanctions in multi-agent systems [?] is the
enforcement of a social control mechanism for the sat-
isfaction of commitments. We focus only on material
sanctions and we do not include social sanctions which
affect trust, credibility or reputation. Moreover, we
have applied four types of material remedies in a spe-
cific domain. In the same spirit of computing penalties
according to the level of harm produced, the amount
of remedies may depend on the time when the con-
tract was breached [?]. A survey on existing tools for
ODR [?] and expectation damages, reliance damages,
and opportunity have also been studied [?, ?, ?].
8 Conclusions
The design of punishment policies applied to specific
domains linking agents actions to material penalties is
an open research issue [?]. The contribution of this
paper contains two ideas: On the one hand, we apply
the principles of contract law in the task dependency
network model [?]. As a result, we enrich that model
by including different types of penalties when agents
breach, thus bringing the model closer to the real world.
On the other hand, in our work we consider penal-
ties that ensure a higher welfare for the supply chains
affected by perturbations, with three levels of infor-
mation sharing for each type of remedy. Some game-
theoretic methodologies would be necessary to solve
such breaching-problems in the context of incomplete
information. This framework is useful for automated
ODR, but it can also be used as an e-service with the
role to mediate disputes between agents.
